

When there is no saddle point, players will play each strategy for a certain percentage of time. Such a game is called mixed strategy game.

### Algebraic method

1. For  $2 \times 2$  pay off matrix with no saddle point the two person, zero-sum game is expressed.

		$B_1(q)$	$B_2(1-q)$
Player A	$A_1(p)$	$C_{11}$	$C_{12}$
	$A_2(1-p)$	$C_{21}$	$C_{22}$

$p$  and  $(1-p)$  are the fraction of time player A plays strategies  $A_1$  &  $A_2$  respectively.

$q$  &  $(1-q)$  are the fraction of time player B plays strategies  $B_1$  &  $B_2$  respectively.

B's strategies  $B_1$  &  $B_2$

$$B_1 = A_1 + A_2 \quad B_2 = A_1 + A_2$$

$$= p \times C_{11} + (1-p)C_{21} \quad \text{--- (1)} \quad p \times C_{12} + (1-p)C_{22} \quad \text{--- (2)}$$

A's strategies  $A_1$  &  $A_2$

$$A_1 = B_1 + B_2 \quad A_2 = B_1 + B_2$$

$$= q \times C_{11} + (1-q)C_{21} \quad \text{--- (3)} \quad = q \times C_{12} + (1-q)C_{22} \quad \text{--- (4)}$$

$$Eq. 1 = 2$$

$$p \times C_{11} + (1-p)C_{21} = p \times C_{12} + (1-p)C_{22}$$

$$p \times C_{11} + C_{21} - p \times C_{21} = p \times C_{12} + C_{22} - p \times C_{22}$$

$$p \times C_{11} + C_{21} - p \times C_{21} = p \times C_{12} + C_{22} - p \times C_{22}$$

$$p \times C_{11} - p \times C_{21} + C_{21} = p \times C_{12} + C_{22} - p \times C_{22}$$

$$p = \frac{C_{22} - C_{21}}{(C_{11} + C_{22}) - (C_{12} + C_{21})}$$

$$q \times C_{11} + (1 - q) C_{12} = q (C_{21}) + (1 - q) C_{22}$$

$$q \times C_{11} + C_{12} - q C_{12} = q C_{21} + C_{22} - q C_{22}$$

$$q = \frac{C_{22} - C_{12}}{(C_{11} + C_{22}) - (C_{12} + C_{21})}$$

### Algebraic method

		Player B	
		B <sub>1</sub>	B <sub>2</sub>
Player A	A <sub>1</sub>	20 <sup>B</sup>	5 <sup>A</sup>
	A <sub>2</sub>	10 <sup>A</sup>	15 <sup>B</sup>

Since there is no saddle point this question will be deal by mixed strategies.

		Player B	
		B <sub>1</sub>	B <sub>2</sub>
Player A	A <sub>1</sub> (P)	(q)	(1-q)
	A <sub>2</sub> (1-P)	10	15

Player A has 2 strategies A<sub>1</sub> = P  
A<sub>2</sub> = (1-P)

Player B has 2 strategies if B<sub>1</sub> = q  
B<sub>2</sub> = (1-q)

#### B's strategies

B<sub>1</sub> and B<sub>2</sub>

$$B_1 = A_1 + A_2 \quad \text{and} \quad B_2 = A_1 + A_2$$

$$B_1 = 20P + 10(1-P) \quad \text{--- (1)} \quad \& \quad B_2 = 5P + 15(1-P) \quad \text{--- (2)}$$

#### A's strategies

A<sub>1</sub> & A<sub>2</sub>

$$A_1 = B_1 + B_2 \quad \& \quad A_2 = B_1 + B_2$$

$$A_1 = 20q + 5(1-q) \quad \& \quad A_2 = 10q + 15(1-q)$$

(3)
(4)

Equalising both expected pay off i.e. outcome  
i.e. equating eq. 1 & 2 and 3 & 4.

$$B_1 = B_2$$

$$20P + 10(1-P) = 5P + 15(1-P)$$

$$20P + 10 - 10P = 5P + 15 - 15P$$

$$10P + 10 = 15 - 10P$$

$$10P + 10P = 15 - 10$$

$$20P = 5$$

$$P = \frac{1}{4}$$

$$1 - P = \frac{3}{4}$$

Equalising eq. 3 & 4.

$$A_1 = A_2$$

$$20q + 5(1-q) = 10q + 15(1-q)$$

$$20q + 5 - 5q = 10q + 15 - 15q$$

$$15q + 5 = -5q + 15$$

$$20q = 10$$

$$q = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$1 - q = \frac{1}{2}$$

Now value of game putting value of P  
in eq. 1 & 2 and value of q in  
eq. 3 & 4.

$$20P + 10(1-P) \text{ --- (1) i.e. } 20 \times \frac{1}{4} + 10 \times \frac{3}{4}$$

$$B_1 = 5 + 7.5 = 12.5$$

$$5P + (15(1-P)) \text{ --- (2) i.e. } 5 \times \frac{1}{4} + 15 \times \frac{3}{4}$$

$$B_2 = \frac{5 + 45}{4} = \frac{50}{4} = 12.5$$

$$20q_1 + 5(1-q_1) \text{ --- (3)}$$

$$\frac{20 \times 1}{2} + \frac{5 \times 1}{2}$$

$$\frac{25}{2} = 12.5$$

$$A_1 = 12.5$$

$$10q_2 + 15(1-q_2) \text{ --- (4)}$$

$$\frac{10 \times 1}{2} + \frac{15 \times 1}{2}$$

$$= \frac{25}{2} = 12.5$$

$$A_2 = 12.5$$

So optimal strategies

A's strategies -  $1/4, 3/4$

B's strategies -  $1/2, 1/2$

Value of game - 12.5

P. 316.

Determine the optimal strategies for A & B in following game

B's strategies

		B <sub>1</sub>	B <sub>2</sub>
A's strategies	A <sub>1</sub>	4	2
	A <sub>2</sub>	1	10

	B <sub>1</sub> (q <sub>1</sub> )	B <sub>2</sub> (1-q <sub>1</sub> )
A <sub>1</sub> (p)	4	2
A <sub>2</sub> (1-p)	1	10

A's strategies

$$A_1 = B_1 + B_2$$

&

$$A_2 = B_1 + B_2$$

$$4q_1 + 2(1-q_1) \text{ --- (1)}$$

$$\& \quad A_2 = 1q_1 + 10(1-q_1) \text{ --- (2)}$$

B's strategies

$B_1$  &  $B_2$

$$B_1 = A_1 + A_2 \quad \& \quad B_2 = A_1 + A_2$$

$$B_1 = 4P + 1(1-P) \text{---(3)} \quad B_2 = 2P + 10(1-P) \text{---(4)}$$

equalising eq 1 & 2 and 3 & 4.

$$A_1 = A_2$$

$$4q + 2(1-q) = 1q + 10(1-q)$$

$$4q + 2 - 2q = 1q + 10 - 10q$$

$$2q + 2 = 10 - 9q$$

$$11q = 8$$

$$q = \frac{8}{11}$$

$$1 - q = 1 - \frac{8}{11} = \frac{3}{11}$$

Equalising eq (3) & (4)

$$4P + 1(1-P) = 2P + 10(1-P)$$

$$4P + 1 - P = 2P + 10 - 10P$$

$$3P + 1 = 10 - 8P$$

$$11P = 9$$

$$P = \frac{9}{11}$$

$$1 - P = \frac{2}{11}$$

Value of game

$$4P + 1(1-P)$$

$$\frac{4 \times 9}{11} + \frac{1 \times 2}{11} = \frac{38}{11}$$